Traditionally, the demand for public expenditures has been estimated using for explanatory variables the average values of per capita income, as well as other variables. The results of this approach are disappointing, due to the lack of a theoretical basis. The public choice model, on the other hand, uses the political decision-making process (median voter model) to explain expenditures. Taking the same set of data, it can be shown that the public choice approach yields superior results. It also offers a solution to the unfruitful discussion about the influence of "political" determinants of public expenditures.

TWO APPROACHES TO ESTIMATING PUBLIC EXPENDITURES

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This study has two goals. The first is to compare two approaches to the problem of estimating public expenditures. On one hand, there is the traditional regression approach which uses for explanatory variables the average values of per capita income, as well as other variables. On the other hand, there is a theoretically based public choice model which uses median values. Second, the study contributes to the age-old debate of whether the determinants of public expenditures for goods and services are "economic" or "political" ones. It will be shown that the median voter model is much better suited to explain the demand for publicly supplied goods than is the traditional approach, which has been widely used in public finance, political science, and political sociology. The results point to the need for a theoretical basis of empirical estimations.
particularly in this area which has been dominated too long by "estimation without theory." Furthermore, a careful specification of the underlying public choice model makes the traditional separation between "economic" and "political" determinants obsolete; it is much more important to grasp firmly the particular politicoeconomic nature of public expenditures. The first part of this paper contrasts the traditional and the public choice approaches. In part two, they are tested with the same set of data in order to evaluate their performance. The last part offers conclusions and some general remarks about empirical estimation in the field of public finance.

COMPARISON OF THE TWO APPROACHES

STATE OF THE DISCUSSION

One of the first and most influential attempts\(^1\) at empirically estimating the determinants of publicly supplied goods and services with the help of multiple regression analysis has been undertaken by Fabricant (1952). In his opinion the differences in the expenditures of American states and communities may largely be attributed to differences in average family income, degree of urbanization, and population density. Without any recourse to the theory of collective choice, but solely on the basis of ad hoc presumptions, he was able to explain statistically more than 70\% of the variance of per capita expenditures in the various political bodies. As this result also applied to such areas as education and welfare, which are of special political importance, it seemed acceptable to conclude that political factors such as voter participation, party competition, and decision rules are of minor importance. Successive studies (for a survey see Bahl, 1969) have essentially come to the same conclusion.

As it could be expected, this conclusion motivated political scientists and sociologists to enter the arena.\(^2\) They tested whether or not the inclusion of "political" variables repre-
senting the legislative, executive, and administrative structures would lead to significant results. This approach was again basically nontheoretical, the explanatory variables having been introduced ad hoc. The empirical results attained were sensational for political scientists: if the level of economic performance in the states and communities is kept constant, “political” variables turn out to have no significant influence on their expenditure behavior (even if—taken by themselves—they are significant). Whether voter participation is high or low, party competition weak or strong, whatever the distribution of power between the legislative and executive branches in the various states and communities—all these political factors seemed to be of no relevance to the explanation of public expenditures. Dye (1966: 293) concludes:

Differences in the policy choices of states with different types of political systems turn out to be largely a product of differing socioeconomic levels rather than a direct product of political variables. Levels of urbanization, industrialization, income, and education appear to be more influential in policy outcomes than political system characteristics.

Only recent empirical research\(^3\) indicates that Dye’s conclusion may be premature. It shows that even if political variables do not affect the absolute level of public expenditures per capita, they do have by far the largest influence upon their distribution among the various classes of income and population. The study by Fry and Winters (1970), which is one of the most typical ones showing the empirical relevance of “politics” for public expenditure decisions, has been repeated by Booms and Halldorson (1973). Introducing some methodological improvements,\(^4\) they repeated the test, again using averages of the variables concerned. They came, however, to the opposite conclusion: the distribution of public income and expenditures is affected by political determinants only to a minor degree. But it seems that it is only a matter of time until someone finds the opposite result by making a minor modification of assumptions.
THE PUBLIC CHOICE MODEL

The confused state of the discussion is no accident as the approaches discussed lack a theoretical basis. The studies have been undertaken in analogy with econometric demand studies for goods and services traded on the market. In these studies it was not taken into account that the demand for publicly supplied goods and services is the result of a collective decision-making process of a quite different nature. It is necessary to specify carefully the particular political choice process which is used to determine public expenditures.

In a political body in which voters directly decide by simple majority about the quantity of public goods—as, e.g., in American and Swiss communities—the median voter position is decisive. This is true as long as the tax system remains unchanged. If, on the other hand, the quantity of public goods and their finance are determined simultaneously, there is an incentive to act strategically, i.e., the free-rider problem arises.

The median voter model allows one to derive income and price elasticities in the demand for public goods by cross-section analysis. For empirical analysis, it is necessary to take into account the various degrees of “publicness” of a public good.

With pure public goods (in the sense of Samuelson), the consumption of one person does not impair the consumption of other persons. The larger the community, the more people may use the same good and, ceteris paribus, the smaller each individual’s cost contribution. Thus, the increasing size of a community leads to economies of scale in the consumption of public goods. With impure goods, the consumption quality falls continually with the number of users. The more people (n) consume the good $x_i$, the lower the individually consumable quantity ($q_{x_i}^{IN}$), due to crowding, for example. Denoting $q_{x_i}$ as the (physical) quantity of public good $i$ supplied, this relationship may be formalized as

$$q_{x_i}^{IN} = q_{x_i} \cdot n^{-\delta}.$$  [1]
δ indicates the “degree of publicness” of good \( x_i \): with a pure public good, \( q_{x_i} \) is by definition identical to \( q_{x_i}^{IN} \), such that \( \delta = 0 \). The more the individual consumable quantity falls with increasing number of users, the larger \( \delta \) is. If each consumer uses only the \( n^{th} \) share of \( q_{x_i} \), there are no economies of scale in consumption, i.e., \( x_i \) is a private good, and \( \delta = 1 \). If there are decreasing returns to scale, \( \delta > 1 \).

The individually consumable quantity of the public good \( i \), \( q_{x_i}^{IN} \), is relevant to the median voter’s function. His budget constraint is

\[
\sum p_{x_m} \cdot q_{x_m} + i_j \cdot \bar{p}_{x_i} \cdot q_{x_i} = \hat{Y}_j \tag{2}
\]

where

\[
q_{x_m} = \text{quantity of goods traded in the market (m = 1, 2 \ldots M)};
\]

\[
p_{x_m} = \text{market price of these goods};
\]

\[
i_j = \text{tax share (i.e., relative contribution to the costs of public goods production) of the median voter in community j};
\]

\[
\bar{p}_{x_i} = \text{the (constant) unit costs of production or “price” of the public good i};
\]

\[
\hat{Y}_j = \text{median income in community j}.
\]

Total income is spent on marketed goods (\( \sum p_{x_m} \cdot q_{x_m} \)) or is taxed away in order to finance the production costs of public goods (\( i_j \cdot \bar{p}_{x_i} \cdot q_{x_i} \)). Substituting equation 1 into equation 2 gives

\[
\sum p_{x_m} \cdot q_{x_m} + i_j \cdot \bar{p}_{x_i} \cdot q_{x_i}^{IN} \cdot n_{ij}^\delta = \hat{Y}_j \tag{3}
\]

\( n_j \) now indicates the population size of community \( j \). The median voter’s demand for individually consumable units of the public good thus depends on his income (\( \hat{Y}_j \)) and the “tax price” (\( i_j \cdot \bar{p}_{x_i} \cdot n_{ij}^\delta \)). Using a constant elasticity demand function

\[
\hat{x}_{ij}^{IN} = k \cdot \hat{Y}_j^\alpha \cdot (i_j \cdot \bar{p}_{x_i} \cdot n_{ij}^\delta)^\beta. \tag{4}
\]
As the political decision is in terms of the physical quantity of public goods $x_{ij}$, the relevant demand function of the median voter is

$$
\hat{x}_{ij} = k \cdot \hat{Y}_j^\alpha \cdot (\hat{y}_{ij} \cdot \hat{p}_{x_{ij}} \cdot n_{ij})^\beta \cdot n_{ij}^\delta.
$$  \[5\]

Assuming equal unit costs of production for public goods in all communities ($\hat{p}_{x_{ij}} = \hat{p}_{x_{ij}}$, for all $j$), and setting $\gamma = \delta(1 + \beta)$, the demand function used for empirical estimation is

$$
\log \hat{x}_{ij} = c + \alpha \log \hat{Y}_j + \beta \log \hat{t}_j + \delta \log n_j + u_{ij}, \text{ where } c = \log k.
$$  \[6\]

This model for the explanation of public expenditures of various categories derived from the theory of collective choice has been confronted with the traditional regression approach in the following manner:

$$
\log x_{ij} = c' + \alpha' \log \bar{Y}_j + \beta' \log \bar{t}_j + \delta' \log n_j + u'_{ij},
$$  \[7\]

where $\bar{Y}_j$ and $\bar{t}_j$ are average income and average tax share, respectively. The error terms, $u_{ij}$ and $u'_{ij}$, are assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance.¹

**EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE TWO MODELS**

The performance of the two models given by equations 6 and 7 was tested by applying them to the same set of empirical data. This has not been mentioned in the literature up to the present, but the two approaches have been empirically estimated in isolation. The two models were tested in a cross-section of 74 political communities (Gemeinden) in the Swiss canton of Baselland. The institutional set-up conformed to the conditions necessary for the application of the theoretically oriented public choice model (as well as, of course, for the traditional ad hoc approach): after a period of discussion, decisions can be taken by direct simple majority vote; it is possible to propose
### Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spending Categories</th>
<th>Demand Elasticities with Respect to</th>
<th>Degree of Publiciness</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Income</td>
<td>Tax Share</td>
<td>Size of Population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E 1 General Administration</td>
<td>0.526*</td>
<td>-0.247</td>
<td>0.747*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E 2 Education</td>
<td>0.358*</td>
<td>0.320*</td>
<td>0.664*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E 3 Culture</td>
<td>3.802*</td>
<td>-5.238*</td>
<td>-3.758*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E 4 Health, Recreation and Sports</td>
<td>1.459</td>
<td>0.354</td>
<td>1.446*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E 5 Roads</td>
<td>-1.004*</td>
<td>-6.684</td>
<td>0.818*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E 6 Social Assistance</td>
<td>1.037*</td>
<td>0.838*</td>
<td>1.841*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E 7 Fire Protection</td>
<td>0.550</td>
<td>-0.331</td>
<td>0.337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E 8 Total</td>
<td>0.320</td>
<td>-0.264</td>
<td>0.746*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Figures in parentheses indicate t-values. Starred figures indicate statistically significant values at a 95% level of security.

a. Additional including current expenditures for police. Not included are expenditures for military purposes, churches, water, and interest payments.
changes in a project from the floor; a very small number of citizens are necessary in order to call an assembly. The tax system consists of (until recently) proportional taxes on income and wealth, a fact which simplifies the analysis.

Table 1 shows the regression estimates (SSLS) for the median-voter model. In order not to commit a specification error due to the possible influence of structural differences in the communities, the regression equation 6 has been amended by variables showing the influence of growth, density, and age composition in the population. Most of the parameters estimated and reproduced in Table 1 show the theoretically expected sign and are statistically significant. With one exception, all the income elasticity estimates are positive and statistically significant. The elasticity of the tax share is expected to be negative. This is indeed true for all but one value, which is statistically significant. Of all income and "tax price" elasticities, there are thus only two which may be said not to conform to theoretical expectations.

The parameter estimates for the degree of "publicness," $\delta$, are in general close to one, indicating neither positive nor negative economies of scale in consumption. However, there are some exceptions. Fire protection seems to be the expenditure category with the largest public good characteristic perceived by the voter: when the size of the population increases, the individual citizen does not seem to experience any significant reduction of protection. To a somewhat smaller extent this also applies to cultural services and education. The opposite seems to be true for health, recreation, and sports, and in particular for local roads. The value $\delta$ over 2.5 indicates large diseconomies of scale in use: as the number of people increases, an individual citizen's consumption potential decreases.

It should be noted that only a few coefficients relating to the structural characteristics of the population turn out to be statistically significant. Some of the significant influences may be readily explained by taking into account the (possible) merit good nature of expenditures for social assistance, as well as for health, recreation, and sports. In the first case there is a
### TABLE 2
Traditional Model (average values): Determinants of Public Expenditures
for Various Categories

(74 political communities of the canton of Baselland, 1969)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spending categories</th>
<th>demand elasticities with respect to</th>
<th>population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>income share</td>
<td>size of population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E 1 General Administration</td>
<td>.321</td>
<td>2.893*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.547)</td>
<td>(2.589)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E 2 Education</td>
<td>.182</td>
<td>1.233*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.361)</td>
<td>(2.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E 3 Culture</td>
<td>.668</td>
<td>4.886*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.607)</td>
<td>(.636)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E 4 Health, Recreations and Sports</td>
<td>.381</td>
<td>1.785*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.696)</td>
<td>(2.881)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E 5 Roads</td>
<td>-.140</td>
<td>2.101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.328)</td>
<td>(.941)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E 6 Social assistance</td>
<td>-.124</td>
<td>-.881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.370)</td>
<td>(.495)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E 7 Fire protection</td>
<td>-.380</td>
<td>-.790*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.499)</td>
<td>(1.341)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E 8 Total</td>
<td>.231*</td>
<td>1.505*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.474)</td>
<td>(3.035)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Figures in parentheses indicate t-values. Starred figures indicate statistically significant values at a 95% level of security.
b. Additional including current expenditures for police. Not included are expenditures for military purposes, churches, water, and interest payments.
statistically significant influence of the share of people over 65 years of age in the population, and in the second case of the age-group below 19 years of age. The estimation results obtained correspond closely to those obtained by Borchering and Deacon (1972) and by Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) in U.S. communities.

The estimates on the basis of the median voter model (equation 6 and Table 1) have now been confronted with the traditional ad hoc model, which uses average values of income and “tax share prices.” Most econometric regression approaches do not consider the influence of taxation, and this is a grave specification error (see Wilde, 1972). The average approach tested here is thus improved. Equation 7 is amended by the same population variables as in the estimate of median values. The results are shown in Table 2.

The value of δ has not been calculated, as it is of no interest in this context. As may easily be seen, practically none of the parameter estimates is statistically significant. This applies to income and tax price elasticities as well as to the effects of the population structure. For the explanation of the various expenditure characteristics, no income elasticity and only two tax price elasticities have a statistically significant influence. The regression equation for total expenditure yields better results primarily due to an aggregation effect (see Weicher and Emerine, 1973).

CONCLUSION

The (statistical) superiority of the median voter approach based on a collective choice model indicates that the debate about whether political or economic factors determine public expenditures is unfruitful. It shows, moreover, the usefulness of proceeding with an explicit politicoeconomic model in the explanation of public expenditures. This is true at least for the
particular example studied. It seems acceptable, however, to
generalize this experience: as public expenditures are deter-
mined in a political context, it is necessary to specify carefully
the underlying politicoeconomic model. For local expenditures
decided by direct vote, the median voter model is appropriate.
In many cases, public expenditures are decided by parliamen-
tary procedures and are subject to a strong bureaucratic
influence. In that case, the underlying politicoeconomic model
must be appropriately modified. It is time that public expendi-
ture studies as well as other empirical studies in public finance
leave the phase of “estimation without theory” and turn to the
testing of carefully specified politicoeconomic relationships.

NOTES

1. There are some earlier studies in this tradition, e.g., Colm et al. (1936).
2. E.g., Dawson and Robinson (1963), Dye (1966), Sharkansky and Hofferbert
3. Originating from Jacob and Lipsky (1968) and Pulsipher and Weatserby
(1968) are Dye (1969), Fry and Winters (1970), and, even more recently, Deleón
(1973) and Uslaner and Weber (1975).
4. The major shortcoming of the Fry and Winters (1970) study lies in the fact
that they take the national distribution of families and unattached individuals per
income class instead of the distribution within each state.
5. This has already been shown by Black (1948), Barr and Davis (1966), and,
more recently, Bergstrom and Goodman (1973), and has been generalized by Rae and
Taylor (1971).
6. See Borcherding and Deacon (1972, esp. p. 893). It should be noted that this
relationship implies nondiscrimination.
7. The reader should note that equations 6 and 7 do not measure physical
quantities, but price times quantity. As $p_{ij}$ is assumed constant over units, this is of
no effect here.
9. In U.S. studies on this subject, the possibility of voting cycles or coalitions of
minorities could not be ruled out on a priori grounds, but only because the empirical
estimates suggest stability. Direct democracy in the Swiss system would seem to rule
out implicit logrolling, since transactions between citizens seem too costly.
REFERENCES


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