Too much and too little government

Economic growth in many developing countries is hampered by excessive government. The state tends to interfere in almost all activities and endeavors to regulate them minutely. The government sector which is often very large, employs a high proportion of the population outside agriculture. The administration tends to be more bureaucratic than in industrial countries. In addition, rent-seeking distortions are rampant (e.g., public officials often receive much higher incomes relative to other occupations) and waste is pervasive. Many public employees do not really work in a productive sense, and some rarely show up for work. This combination of interventionism and bureaucracy stifles investment and innovation in the private sector (see, e.g., Ostrom, 1990; Krueger, 1992).

In these respects there is ‘over-government’ in the developing countries. At the same time, however, many governments do not adequately fulfil the functions necessary for rapid economic growth. Most importantly, they do not sufficiently secure the property rights which are needed for private economic activities. Investors are faced with a high degree of uncertainty, and are therefore reluctant to commit themselves over a longer run. Instead of concentrating on productive endeavors, investors are devoting their time and money to finding substitutes for the deficient property rights.

Governments in most third world countries are inadequate in a second, quite different sense. They are far from meeting the wishes of the citizens; many are either strongly paternalistic or even dictatorial. Changes in government rarely consider the preferences of the ordinary citizens. Rather, they merely substitute one group of the reigning elite or military with another. While the preferences of the city dwellers—in
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particular of the capital—are at least taken into account as far as to evade an uprising, the preferences of the population living in the countryside are almost totally disregarded. While some third world countries are officially federal, central governments are distanced from the fragmented local problems and demands, and consequently neglect them (e.g., de Valk and Wekwete, 1990). Often, central government interference actively destroys traditional, well-working production and distribution arrangements, in particular self-governing units (Ostrom, 1990, pp.159–64; 1994).

Developing countries are thus faced with a paradoxical situation: at the same time there is 'over-government' (i.e., interventionism which hinders economic progress) and 'under-government' (too few governments caring for the fragmented local problems). This chapter advances a proposal designed to solve this paradox. We suggest a new and extreme type of federalism which allows for a much larger number of governments. The proposed units are based on grass-root local democracy which checks government and prevents it from evolving into an oppressive and intervening bureaucracy. Our proposal is radical as it deviates strongly from developing plans. It is worth observing that a large part of the economic literature on development does not deal with the structure of government. The failures of government are duly noted, but proposals of overcoming the lacuna are rarely advanced. To just hope that the future will bring ‘better politicians’ is unfounded optimism. As Modern Political Economy (or Public Choice, see e.g., Mueller, 1989 or Frey and Eichenberger, 1994 specifically for countries of the third world) has convincingly shown, politicians are not ‘bad’ (or ‘good’) as such, but it is the political institutions which make them, or allow them to behave in a particular way. Government will only improve if the underlying institutional conditions are changed. This is exactly the aim of our proposal: we advocate a system of government in which the basic units are defined by the various functions which the state has to fulfil to enable development. These jurisdictions are formed according to the ‘geography of problems’, i.e., by the citizens seeking to cope with issues they are confronted with. The new type of federalism we envisage— unlike most existing federal units—is not imposed from above (sometimes by the former colonial powers) but forms from below.

Following its acronym, the new system of democratic federalism proposed is called FOCJ (Functional, Overlapping, and Competing Jurisdictions). It was originally conceived for industrial economies (Frey and Eichenberger, 1995; 1996) but proves to be equally (if not more) suitable for developing countries. In this chapter, we first present the basic idea of FOCJ for developing countries, then discuss possible
counterarguments, examine the question of how FOCJ can be established and finally offer a few concluding remarks.

Functional, overlapping, and competing jurisdictions

To establish a system of FOCJ in developing countries constitutes a radical form of federal decentralization, and at the same time democratization. FOCJ have four major characteristics:

(1) They are functional. Each political unit extends over areas defined by the task to be fulfilled. Such functional units may provide particular communal services such as fresh water and the treatment of waste water, electricity, gas and telephone, roads, but also police protection or even defense. In addition to these ‘modern’ functional units, the long-established tribal borders are conserved as they care for particular services and needs (see Klitgaard, 1995). Functional units allow for the economies of scale to be exploited, and for benefits and costs to fully match in order to minimize spillovers. They thus conform to the requirement of ‘fiscal equivalence’ as developed by Olson (1969) and Oates (1972). As a result, the different units are able to cater for differences in local demands.

(2) They are overlapping. In line with the diverse tasks, there are many different governmental units spanning geographical areas of varying sizes. Many of the functions mentioned above can be efficiently provided at the local, communal level (e.g., water, police protection, education, and a large share of medical services) while others extend over a wider geographical area (e.g., overland roads, electricity). A few should be in the realm of the national government, most importantly the guarantee of free mobility and free trade, as well as national defense. However, the bulk of the public activities is provided at lowest cost at the communal level. Small case governmental jurisdictions are also best able to meet the preferences of the citizens. Due to differences in geographical conditions, resource availability, economic activities, as well as the composition of the population with respect to income, occupation, age, race and religion, their demands for publicly provided services may differ widely. In the case of larger cities, the bulk of public services may be provided most efficiently at the level of wards or even blocks.

(3) They are competing. Two mechanisms serve to induce the FOCJ to conform closely to their members' preferences. (a) The possibility to leave or enter a particular FOCUS (as we call the singular of FOCJ) mimics market competition; and (b) The use of democratic voting
establishes political competition. The following paragraphs look at these mechanisms more thoroughly.

(a) Exit may not only be undertaken by individuals or firms by migrating but also by political units such as blocks, wards or communes. They can change the FOCUS to which they belong for particular services if they feel that another FOCUS is providing better services at lower costs. In some cases, it is even possible for individuals to switch FOCJ without changing the physical location. Parents, for example, may send their children to a particular public school which they consider to be the best and most suitable.

The freedom to exit is a powerful force restricting government, and in particular the central state (see recently Weingast, 1995). It stands in stark contrast to the prohibition of secession characterizing national states. The fight against secession has lead to bloody and self-destructing wars, e.g., in Katanga (1960–63), Biafra (1967–70), Bangladesh (1970–71), and over the last years, in Yugoslavia and Russia. The type of exit envisaged here differs crucially from these kinds of secession. The switch from one FOCUS to another FOCUS (e.g., from one provider of school services to another) is a very partial exit only; all other governmental functions remain unaffected. Some citizens of a national state may, for example, form their own units with respect to education (where they specially promote their own language) or with respect to trade laws (they choose the one which best suits the requirements of their business activities). With respect to religion, such diverse units already exist in many countries, and switching from one religious denomination to another is frequently observed. All this is possible without breaking away from the national state. It would, however, be advantageous if such jurisdictions were not just limited to a state but may also extend to other states. There is no reason why, for instance, a FOCUS providing educational or religious services should not cover parts of several nations. The possibility to exit only partially in contrast to being forced to an all-or-none choice of secession is a particularly appealing feature of FOCJ.

When partially leaving a traditional governmental unit and entering a FOCUS, the respective citizens’ tax burden has to be rebalanced. While they have to pay taxes in the new FOCUS to finance the particular services provided, they should get an appropriate tax discount in the unit they partially leave. Moreover, there are circumstances in which a price is warranted for entry and exit. When an individual leaves, jurisdictions may charge a fee equal to the marginal cost of the public services privately appropriated. This is of particular importance in the case of higher education. On entering, one may have to pay a fee in order to share the use of the infrastructure accumulated and financed by the
present members. It is one of the major functions of the central government to secure competition by preventing FOCJ from charging monopolistic entrance and exit prices.

(b) Political competition is effected via democratic institutions. The citizens directly elect the persons managing a particular FOCUS, and they can participate in decision-making about substantive issues by undertaking popular initiatives and referenda (i.e., using the voice option). Wherever possible, the traditional forms of direct democracy should be employed, such as assemblies of all citizens concerned. A system of FOCJ allows to maintain the historically grown governance structures, and fosters their variety.

(4) FOCJ are jurisdictions. A FOCUS is a democratic governmental unit with authority over its citizens. Most importantly, it has the power to tax for the services provided. Taxes are not an oppressive means of financing unknown activities of far away governments but have the character of charging fees for well-defined, particular services. Individuals and communes can newly establish a jurisdiction, when they feel they are more capable of supplying a public good, or doing so at lower costs.

As is true for all other forms of federalism, the power to tax is an essential ingredient of FOCJ. Whenever the central government allocates the funds (as it is the rule in today’s ‘federal’ developing countries, Oates, 1993) the lower level units become dependent on it, so that most of the advantages of decentralization are lost. Under these circumstances, decentralization is not necessarily beneficial. In a system in which the finance is allocated by the center, the lower units have an incentive to become fiscally irresponsible. Local authorities tend to borrow too much on the (normally correct) assumption that they will be bailed out by central government if they run into trouble. In Brazil, say, the Sao Paulo region has accumulated a debt of $40 billion, over 7% of the country’s GDP (see more generally, Tanzi, 1995). In contrast, if FOCJ have the power to levy their own taxes, the population would have to carry the cost of bad politics. Therefore, the governments have an incentive to observe the budget constraint and to behave in a fiscally responsible way.

These four characteristics of FOCJ produce major advantages over the existing form of government in developing countries:

(i) They break the central government’s virtual monopoly of politics which would otherwise stifle economic development and oppress the citizens. FOCJ shift the political power to initiatives from below. Effective local governments become viable because they have authority over a particular government function, and may raise taxes to finance the respective expenditures.
(ii) FOCJ allow combinations of various forms of political rules. They do not only blend federalism and democracy, i.e., exit and voice, but also modern and traditional styles of governing such as meetings by village elders. Time-proven local ways of public decision-making are not dumped but are used and fostered in those areas in which they prove to be effective.

(iii) FOCJ solve the ‘fundamental organizational dilemma’ between an open polity and decentralized development at the local level: ‘... one of the necessary (though far from sufficient) conditions of a development state [is] a large degree of insulation that the development-minded decision-makers can have against the ravages of short-run pork-barrel politics and their ability to use the discipline of the market (...) against the inevitable lobbies of group predation’ (Bhardan, 1993, p. 46). This insulation is made possible in a system of FOCJ by the establishment of new, growth-oriented government units which are, however, disciplined by economic and political competition.

(iv) FOCJ deal with another ‘fundamental dilemma of government’ (Montignola, Qian and Weingast, 1995, pp. 54–5). The state has to be strong enough to enforce the legal rules and especially the property rights which are prerequisites for economic development. At the same time, government institutions have to be ‘weak’ in the sense of not exploiting the citizens, e.g., by expropriating them without compensation or taxing them excessively. FOCJ are able to convey credible limits against such exploitation because each FOCUS is self-financed and may go bankrupt, thus imposing a hard budget constraint. In a system of FOCJ, individuals and firms do not face a monopolistic and therefore oppressive state, but may resort to substitutes.

(v) There is an emphasis on local public production and efficient polycentric organization. This aspect has been much neglected.¹

(vi) The fiscal decentralization induced by FOCJ reduces the volatility in macroeconomic variables (e.g., in budget deficits, income growth).

(vii) The concept of FOCJ overcomes the fruitless contradiction of ‘government versus market’ which was typical of many of the writings on developing countries (see Klitgaard, 1991; Ostrom, 1990). Rather, a third form of governance is enabled to play its role, the self-government of the persons directly involved in a particular public task.
FOCJ evaluated

FOCJ mark a radical departure from much of the earlier literature on developing countries which emphasized the need for a strong, well-organized central state and bureaucracy to steer and support economic growth. They depart from the more recent exclusive emphasis on private property and free markets as the clue for successful development. In both cases, local governments needed for economic growth are neglected. Some readers may, however, think that the advantages of FOCJ as claimed are much too optimistic, and that the proposal is just naive. We present here five assertions which are often brought up, but which we will refute:

Assertion 1. FOCJ have never existed

This historical critique is factually incorrect. The pre-colonial political system in developing countries was characterized by various forms of self-government (e.g., Manglapres, 1987) though they, of course, did not meet the criteria of democracy which we are familiar with. Vestiges remain even today, but this traditional way of governing was on the whole destroyed by the authoritarian colonial rule (e.g., Chazan, 1994; Oates, 1993; Oberreuter and Weiland, 1994). Post-colonial governments wanted to centralize as much power as possible in their hands and consequently destroyed traditional local rule (see Diamond, 1994; Oates, 1993; Ostrom, 1990).

Assertion 2. FOCJ are unsuitable for developing countries

The ‘culturalist position’ (e.g., Booth and Seligman, 1994) maintains that individuals in developing regions are basically different from Westerners, and therefore need a different form of government, arguably a more authoritarian one. A popular version of this belief is that people in third world countries lack the discipline and initiative to form FOCJ. The economic approach to human behavior (Becker, 1976, Frey, 1992) suggests the opposite causation. The lack of discipline and initiative observed is the consequence (and not the cause) of unfavorable institutional settings. Three types of empirical observations strongly support the economic view:

(i) When individuals in developing countries shed the stifling restrictions imposed upon them by government bureaucracies, they become active and venturesome. Thus, de Soto (1989) has shown for Peru that people who are passive within the confines of the highly
regulated and inimical official sector become enterprising and energetic once they act in the unofficial or shadow economy. This observation does not only apply to Peru but also to all developing countries as casual observation (e.g., the dramatic changes in Asia) and scientific research show. Indeed, the unofficial economy is extremely lively but has, of course, limits. The people who are active in it evade taxes and disregard public regulations, and become independent. Such an emancipation of the population from the (central) government is dangerous for the political class because it demonstrates that government is not needed, at least for some purposes. As a consequence, existing governments make strong efforts to clamp down on the unofficial economy (but, fortunately, often with little success). In contrast, FOCJ constitute a means to reintegrate the shadow sector into the official economy without destroying its vigor.

(ii) Empirical evidence shows that to the extent self-governance could be preserved, it often functions well and is even able to solve difficult common property resource problems (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom, Schroeder and Wynee, 1993; Wade, 1988).

(iii) Even experiences with an extreme form of democracy, popular referenda, are positive-provided they are devoted to substantive issues and not simply plebiscites to support the authoritarian or dictatorial rulers (Rourke, Hines and Zirakzadeh, 1992). If they are taken seriously, people in developing countries do participate in political affairs (for Africa, e.g., Chazan, 1994; for Mexico, see Oberreuter and Weiland, 1994).

**Assertion 3. FOCJ worsen inequality**

Many people believe that central governments promote equality while federal systems make the rich richer and the poor poorer. Central governments are at best formally committed to an ‘equal’ provision of public services but in actual fact, there are huge differences in the services provided across the country (Ostrom et al., 1993, p. 211. speak of a ‘myth of equality’). Typically, the population in the capital is grossly favored, in particular by highly subsidized food, while the much poorer inhabitants in the rural areas are taxed (Bates, 1988). FOCJ redress such imbalances because they are based on decentralized decision-making and subsequently allow regional and local development of the natural and human resources available.
Assertion 4. FOCJ are uncoordinated and create spillovers

This argument is unfounded because FOCJ are established precisely to minimize spillovers as they extend over the relevant functional areas. It could at best be argued that there are spillovers between FOCJ. However, the same problem exists within unitary centralized governments where cooperation between various state agencies is difficult, but not impossible to achieve. FOCJ coordinate their activities in a similar way as do state agencies, namely by exchanging information and by bargaining.

Assertion 5. FOCJ are not new

There is virtually nothing new under the sun; this also applies to the idea of establishing functional, overlapping, and competing jurisdictions. A similar concept has been suggested by Burnheim (1985) but he has not worked it out, and has linked it to rather wild ideas on property rights in land and capital. Tullock (1994) is another forerunner. He observes that in the United States there are functional units which care for particular public services, and which are formed and controlled by particular groups of citizens. Neither Burnheim nor Tullock relate their observations to the various governmental units, such as the American ‘special districts’ (see Zax, 1988), to the ‘Zweckverbände’ existing in German-speaking countries, or to the multiple, overlapping communes in Switzerland (see Frey and Eichenberger, 1995). Moreover, even old ideas can be useful. What matters is whether an idea can become important in the current intellectual debate, and can be applied in reality. On both accounts, FOCJ seem to be worth expounding. The importance of the dynamic form of federalism proposed by us is certainly not common currency. Two recent authoritative politico-economic works on developing countries (Krueger, 1992; Bates, 1988) do not even once mention the concepts of ‘federalism’, ‘devolution’, ‘decentralization’ or ‘direct democracy’.

How can FOCJ emerge?

FOCJ are not established by government fiat; they arise endogenously from below if the population considers them to be advantageous. The only, but crucial, conditions are that (i) the constitution allows the establishment of FOCJ, (ii) existing and newly-founded FOCJ are tolerated by higher level governments and bureaucracies, and (iii) the citizens forming a new FOCUS have to get an appropriate tax discount in
the governmental unit they partially leave. Many third world nations, particularly in South America, are focused on a legalist and constructivist concept of institutions which makes it difficult to allow for spontaneously emerging jurisdictions. Even more difficult to reach are the second and the third conditions. The professional politicians both in and out of government, comprising typically the established élite, put up fierce resistance to FOCJ because they would necessarily lose part of their power. The emergence of FOCJ would indeed basically change politics in developing countries. This resistance is difficult to overcome but development aid by the World Bank and donor nations could be used to circumvent established political élites as much as possible, and to favor local self-government in the form of FOCJ.

Conclusions

Functional, Overlapping, and Competing Jurisdictions (FOCJ) provide a useful system of dynamic federalism and democracy that is able to solve some of the major problems of economic and social development in third world countries. It breaks the monopoly of central government and shifts the power to local, functional and democratic units.

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Note


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