Recent scandals involving large firms, in the US and elsewhere, have intensified discussion regarding the role and conduct of the corporation. The contributors to this book argue that much of this debate has been trapped between the Shareholder and Stakeholder views. They argue that what is needed are precise and design-oriented models for corporate governance that are contingent and pluralistic.

Drawing on insights from a variety of fields, including Management Studies, Organization Studies, Economics and Finance, Political Science, Sociology, Psychology, and Legal Studies, this book offers an extension of current economic models for a broader context of multiple principals and objectives. In doing so it turns our attention to some neglected organizational mechanisms of governance beyond those of ownership, governance bodies, and law.


Corporate Governance and Firm Organization provides an important contribution to the corporate governance debate, and will be essential reading for academics and graduate students of Corporate Governance, Business and Management, Economics, Finance, Sociology, and Law; Consultants, professionals, and policymakers working in the area of corporate governance.

Edited by Anna Grandori
Corporate Governance for Crooks? The Case for Corporate Virtue

Margit Osterloh and Bruno S. Frey

Double Trouble with Managerial Behavior: Exorbitant Salaries and Scandalous Fraud

In recent times, the media have been full of accounts of managerial misbehavior. For some considerable time, the often exorbitant salaries of CEOs and other top managers have made the headlines. This is not surprising if one takes into consideration that some managers were able to amass huge incomes in the form of bonuses, stock options, and many different forms of fringe benefits and perks. A pertinent example is General Electric's Jack Welch, who in 1998 received US$261.5m in stock options, $7.2m in bonuses and a base salary of $2.8m. Another example is Disney's Michael Eisner who, in the same year, received $167.2m, $5.0m, and $0.8m respectively. On average, the income of the top managers of ten widely known US companies, such as American Express, Boeing, Coca-Cola, Chevron, or Merck, amounted to $76m in stock options, $3m in bonuses and $1.3m in base salary (The Economist 1999: 4). As a consequence, the imbalances in income distribution have deteriorated significantly. In 1970, an average CEO earned, on average, twenty-five times as much as an industrial worker. Twenty-six years later, in 1996, the average CEO earned about seventy-five times as much, if we take only base salaries and bonuses into account. If we look at income including exercised stock options, the income differential reaches an almost incredible level. The ratio rises from a factor of twenty-five in 1970 to a factor of 210 in 1996 (Murphy 1999: 2553). The prospect of such huge salaries has led some top managers to act in ways that are detrimental to their firms. In particular, they have sucked up short-term profits instead of focusing on long-term opportunities, and they have neglected paying out dividends to their shareholders (Lambert, Laran, and Lucker 1989). In his authoritative survey on 'Executive Compensation' in the Handbook of Labour Economics, Kevin Murphy (1999: 2555) has this to say: 'Although there is ample evidence that CEOs (and other employees) respond predictably to dysfunctional compensation arrangements, it is more difficult to document that the increase in stock-based incentives has led CEOs to work harder, smarter, and more in the interest of shareholders.'

Corporate scandals are reflected in fraudulent accounts. Well-known examples are Worldcom, Xerox, and Enron. In some cases, the CEOs who fiddle the accounts are the same persons who receive exorbitant compensations, for example, Enron's Kenneth Lay and Worldcom's Scott Sullivan (Cassidy 2002). These scandals cause an enormous amount of damage, not only to the companies affected but also to the market economy as a whole. Many observers argue that the drop in stock prices has gained added impetus as a result of such misbehavior. Investors have lost trust in managers.

However, major contributors to agency theory tend to defend the existing corporate governance system. But most of them admit major weaknesses in the approach. An example is Holmstrom and Kaplan (2003: 2), who state: '... while parts of the U.S. corporate governance system failed under the exceptional strain of the 1990's, the overall system, which includes oversight by the public and the government, reacted quickly to address the problems'. Jensen (The Economist 2002b: 66) accepts that the existing system of managing compensation, especially by the use of stock options, is seriously deficient: he argues that it has proven to be 'managerial heroin', encouraging a focus on short-term highs, with destructive long-term consequences. But he believes that the system can be salvaged by better-designed share options.

Politicians and some scholars reacted in line with this orthodox view of agency theory. They suggest more monitoring and sanctioning of management, first at the level of the board of directors and second at the level of legal regulations. On the board of directors, a higher number of 'independent' directors are expected to curb managerial discretion. In addition, the members of the board themselves should be recompensed with performance-related compensation in order to induce them to exercise more effective control. In the United States, by means of the Sarbanes/Oxley Act, Congress forced the top managers of firms with a turnover exceeding $1.5bn to take an oath promising not to fiddle their accounts. If caught breaking the regulations, the CEOs risk serious personal consequences, including imprisonment. Clearly, the public no longer trusts their corporate leaders to be honest without the threat of prison doors slamming behind them.

We argue that these effects will create a structure encouraging governance for crooks. Corporate governance, when based on the principles of monitoring and sanctioning, tends to worsen the very problem it is designed to solve. The apparent remedy raises the incentives by managers and other employees to take advantage of the firm they are supposed to care about. Instead of...
strict monitoring and sanctioning, we suggest that the conditions which
led to the breeding of crooks have to be taken into account, as Argyris (1964)
stated forty years ago.

The second section argues that the basic problem of corporate governance
is the existence of a social dilemma, causing self-interested individuals
to neglect the common good of the firm. Corporate virtue is one of
the most important common goods in firms. Social dilemmas cannot be
solved by still more privatizing, but rather by putting more emphasis on
employees’ intrinsic motivation to contribute to the common good of the
firm. In the third section, we explain the difference between extrinsic
and intrinsic motivation and its relevance for mitigating social dilemmas.
The fourth section presents theoretical and empirical findings for the
crowding-out and crowding-in effects, suggesting that the preferences of
the employees are influenced by the way corporate governance is run. Drawing
on these insights, the fifth section explains why traditional agency theory
does not provide adequate answers to the current problems of corporate
governance. The sixth section suggests alternative measures, based on
motivation crowding theory. The last section concludes.

What Has Gone Wrong?

It seems that the whole corporate sector has been infiltrated by malprac-
tice, greed, and distrust. This happened even though most companies were
governed by boards composed of outstanding people. Nor has a larger pro-
portion of outside directors had much effect. Some of the most extreme
cases of malpractices occurred in corporations with a majority of outside
directors, such as Enron (80 percent outside directors), Tyco (65 percent)
and WorldCom (45 percent) (Tosi, Shen, and Gentry 2003). A meta-analysis
of fifty-four studies of board dependence showed no statistical relationship
between board independence and firm financial performance (Dalton et al.
1998). Moreover, the firms were often audited by well-established lawyers,
bankers, and accountants. Thus, Enron’s auditing committee was chaired by
a distinguished accounting professor (The Economist 2002a: 90). How can these
facts be explained?

In companies, activities are characterized by a high degree of complex
33) makes this point very clear in his important paper on organizations and
markets:

In general, the greater the interdependence among various members of the
organization, the more difficult it is to measure their separate contributions to
the achievement of organizational goals. But of course, intense interdependence
is precisely what makes it advantageous to organize people instead of depending
wholly on market transactions.

However, particularly intensive interdependencies create a special kind of
governance problem. Their outcome cannot be attributed to any particular
actor. Therefore, incentives for free-riding arise (Osterloh, Frost, and Welzel
2002). In this situation, there is an immediate danger of a social dilemma.

Thus, social dilemmas are at the heart of a firm’s activities, in contrast
to competitive markets (Miller 1992; Frey and Osterloh 2002). Social
dilemmas arise if the actions of self-interested individuals do not lead to socially
desirable outcomes. This kind of conflict between individual and collective
rationality is modeled in the prisoner’s dilemma game. Dawes defines
social dilemmas as situations in which ‘... a) each individual receives a
higher payoff for a socially defective choice (e.g. using all the energy avail-
able, polluting his or her neighbors) than for a socially cooperative choice,
no matter what the other individuals in society do, but b) all individuals are
better off if all cooperate than if all defect’ (Dawes 1980: 169). Self-inter-
ested individuals do not consider the externalities their actions impose
on others when choosing their course of action, leading to either over-
use (in the case of external costs) or undersupply (in the case of external
benefits) of the collective goods in question. In firms, social dilemmas
arise whenever a group of people jointly use or produce some resources
without having the possibility of attributing the value of their consumption
or production to the individuals of this group. Such a situation has
been called the ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin 1968). Today, the most
important ‘commons’ in companies are not only accumulated organizational
knowledge or absorptive capacity, corporate culture, and common organiza-
tional routines, as widely discussed within the knowledge-based theories
of the firm (for example, Grant 1996; Kogut and Zander 1996; Nonaka
and Takeuchi 1995). Rather, we argue that a crucial ‘commons’ consists of
corporate virtue. This entails a generally shared notion of what business
honesty is about and behaving honestly, even when not being watched. Cor-
porate virtue, similar to corporate reputation, is a public good within the
firm. As is the case with all public goods, the characteristics of non-rivalry
and non-excludability cause a problem of undersupply unless formal sancti-
tions or informal mechanisms such as peer pressure raise costs (Kandel
and Lazear 1992) or the common good enters into the preferences of the
employees (Sen 1974). Efforts to solve this social dilemma by offering
private incentives are doomed to failure if employee’s contributions are
not measurable, as is the case with intensive interdependencies. Under such
circumstances, market failures are imported into the firm (see, for example,
Vining 2003).

The scandals demonstrate that such undermining of corporate virtue has
indeed taken place due to individual incentives. In the case of Enron, people
were paid like entrepreneurs. Short-term thinking and, at the same time,
performance distortion were encouraged (Spector 2003). They were even induced
to resort to illegal actions. Dishonest behavior was by no means
restricted to top management, but filtered down through many layers within the corporation. With Enron, for instance, it was revealed that the whole board, including its president and vice president, knew about the malpractice. It was also general knowledge among the firm’s employees. In the case of WorldCom, dishonesty was not confined to the accounting department; the sales staff also falsified the accounts.

What has gone wrong is a general deterioration of intrinsic motivation to contribute to the corporate virtue. We refer to a distinction between two kinds of motivation: extrinsic motivation and intrinsic motivation.

Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivation

In order to distinguish between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation and to study their interdependence, various authors (Deci, Koestner, and Ryan 1999; Frey 1997; Osterloh and Frey 2000) offer a new way of mitigating social dilemmas.

Extrinsic motivation works through indirect satisfaction of needs, most importantly through monetary compensation. This kind of motivation dominates in conventional economics. The extensive use of pay for performance schemes has focused the attention of both principals and agents in the firm on extrinsic motivation. As a result, employees have been conditioned to perceive the money received as being an overriding incentive. Extensive research accumulated over recent decades has established the importance of a very different kind of motivation in the firm, namely intrinsic motivation. In this case, an activity is valued for its own sake and is self-sustained. The work context itself provides satisfaction or utility.¹

Intrinsic motivation is indispensable when external incentives cannot solve the problems of social dilemmas, either because behavior is not observable or because the outcomes are not attributable to individuals. If there is an intrinsic motivation to work and to cooperate, contributing to the common good ceases to become a social dilemma. This is true not only in the case of contributing to common knowledge but also in the case of incorporating norms of honesty and corporate virtue in firms. Sanctioning of norm-violators in firms is efficient only when there is a certain amount of intrinsic motivation on the part of the one doing the sanctioning as well as on the part of the norm violator. On the part of the one doing the

¹ In economics, with the exception of Frey (1997), and more recently Benabou and Tirole (2002) and Slivka (2003), only a few authors deal with intrinsic motivation. Examples are implicit contracts (Abeloff 1982) or norms (Keszeg 1997). Some economists admit the existence of intrinsic motivation, but then leave it aside because it is difficult to analyze and control (for example, Williamson 1975), even if they agree that the assumption of solely extrinsically motivated people is an “extreme caricature” (Migros and Robins 1992: 42). These authors believe that institutions should be designed as if people were entirely selfish. But this has consequences for the crowding-out effect of intrinsic motivation.
3. More generally, careful laboratory research in economics and psychology reveals that a large number of people voluntarily contribute to public goods (see the surveys by Rabin 1998 and Ostrom 1998).

These instances show that the social dilemma can be overcome if intrinsically motivated pro-social behavior exists. If the love of work and the good of the community enter into the preferences of the actors, the social dilemma is transformed into a coordination game in which there is no social dilemma.

The reason why corporate virtue—which patently exists in the corporate sector—has weakened can be located in motivation crowding theory. This is discussed in the next section.

Why has Corporate Virtue been Undermined? Motivation Crowding Effects

Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation are not additive. Rather, there is a dynamic relationship between the two. This dependence has been observed in a large number of experiments (Deci 1975; Deci, Koestner, and Ryan 1999), as well as in field research (for example, Barkema 1995; Frey, Oberholzer-Gee, and Eichenberger 1996; Gneezy and Rustichini 2000a, 2000b). These relationships between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation are called crowding effects (Frey 1997). These effects show that preferences are influenced by outside intervention. This relationship has important consequences for corporate governance. In the case of fraudulent accounts and exorbitant pay, external intervention took the form of employees’ conditioning on monetary incentives.

The crowding theory of motivation (Frey 1997; Frey and Osterloh 2002) analyzes the systematic dynamic relationship between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation. Crowding effects can be subdivided into a crowding-out effect and a crowding-in effect. We discuss each of these effects in turn.

Crowding-out Effect

According to self-determination theory (Deci and Ryan 1985, 2000), crowding out can take place first, because perceived self-determination suffers from external interventions in the form of monetary incentives. As a result, individuals shift their ‘locus of causality’ from inside to outside. Their attention shifts from the activity itself to the monetary reward. The content of the activity loses its importance. In the case of civic virtue, intrinsically motivated honesty was undermined by the presumption that agents are solely in the interests of the shareholders if their compensation is high enough. It was overlooked that exactly that conditioning on monetary compensation reduces the voluntary commitment to the firm and its shareholders. Such commitment is necessary when behavior and outcomes cannot be monitored or attributed to a particular individual. A precondition for crowding-out to occur is that the individuals concerned have intrinsic motivation, which can then be undermined.2

There is much empirical evidence supporting this conclusion (for a comprehensive overview of empirical evidence, see Frey and Jegen 2001). It is impossible to summarize the results here of the large number of laboratory experiments on the crowding effect. Fortunately, no fewer than five formal meta-empirical studies of crowding theory are available. Rummel and Peinberg (1988) carried out forty-five experimental studies from 1971 to 1985; Rummel and Peinberg (1988) carried out forty-five experimental studies from 1971 to 1985; and others carried out twenty studies from 1971 to 1990; and Tang and Hall (1995) carried out fifty studies from 1972 to 1992. These meta-analyses essentially support the findings that intrinsic motivation is undermined.3

Deci, Koestner, and Ryan (1999) conducted an extensive meta-analysis. These laboratory experiments all consider effects of external interventions on enjoyment-based intrinsic motivation. But there are also experiments on which focus on obligation-based norms, such as perceived obligations of reciprocity. The experiments by Fehr and Gächter (2002) and Eichenberger, reciprocity. The experiments by Fehr and Gächter (2002) and Eichenberger, reciprocity. The experiments by Fehr and Gächter (2002) and Eichenberger, reciprocity. The experiments by Fehr and Gächter (2002) and Eichenberger, reciprocity. The experiments by Fehr and Gächter (2002) and Eichenberger, reciprocity. The experiments by Fehr and Gächter (2002) and Eichenberger, reciprocity. The experiments by Fehr and Gächter (2002) and Eichenberger, reciprocity. The experiments by Fehr and Gächter (2002) and Eichenberger, reciprocity. The experiments by Fehr and Gächter (2002) and Eichenberger, reciprocity. 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Another real-life case of the crowding-out effect is provided by blood donors, as argued by Tiemann (1970). Paying donors for giving blood undermines the intrinsic motivation to do so. Though it is difficult to isolate the many different influences on blood supply, in countries where most of the blood is supplied free of charge paying for blood is likely to reduce total supply (Upson 1973). The crowding-out effect has also been shown to exist in econometric analyses for the so-called not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) syndrome (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997; Frey, Oberholzer-Gee, and Eichenberger 1996). In a carefully designed survey for a community located in central Switzerland, more than half the respondents (50.8 per cent) agreed to have a nuclear waste repository built in their community. When compensation (in monetary terms) was offered, the level of acceptance dropped to 24.6 per cent. Baumol and Oates (1979), Hahn (1989) and Kelman (1961) observed that, under certain conditions, the introduction of environmental charges has little effect. When the penalty for environmental pollution is perceived to be very controlling, people are no longer so motivated to protect the environment for intrinsic reasons. Stokas, Snyder, and Clary (1999) show that voluntary contributions to unpaid helping activities are higher when external pressure is low. Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a) found in a field study that firing parents for picking up their children late from a childcare center had an adverse effect. The fine led to a significantly lower level of punctuality. When the fine was discontinued, punctuality remained at the lower level. Obviously, the parents’ obligation to norms of good conduct was undermined by the external monetary intervention. In a second study, the same authors (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000b) analyzed the behavior of school children collecting money voluntarily, that is, without monetary compensation (for example, for cancer research or disabled children). The children reduced their efforts by about 36 per cent when they were promised a bonus of 1 per cent of the money collected. Their effort to collect for the good cause could be significantly raised again only when the bonus was increased from 1 per cent to 10 per cent of the money collected, but they did not reach the initial collection level again.

This field experiment shows clearly that there are two countervailing forces affecting behavior: the first is the standard relative price effect, suggesting that an increase in payment increases effort. This is shown in Fig. 8.1, which illustrates the well-known supply curve of work effort.

The second countervailing force affecting behavior is the crowding-out effect, suggesting that an increase in payment reduces effort. In our example, both experimental and field studies indicate that children begin to lose interest as a result of the bonus. As shown in Fig. 8.2 the supply curve shifts to the left from S to S’. As a result, children’s efforts fall to A2.

There is, however, one essential prerequisite: intrinsic motivation must have been present at the outset, otherwise there would be nothing to undermine. In the case of straightforward activities, for instance, where
to public goods in social dilemmas as long as a relevant number of other individuals also contribute. They are conditional cooperators (Levi 1988; Ostrom 2000; Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr 2001). On the other hand, many people are conditional defectors. As a consequence, intrinsic motivation is crowded out if too many people free ride. Employees' honesty is undermined if they see that their superiors feather their own nests at the expense of their employees. They are no longer prepared to contribute voluntarily to the common good of honesty and to blame their colleagues if they fail to do so. Therefore, institutional mechanisms must be put in place hindering such exploitation. Corporate governance rules are needed which impose on managers what Hansmann (1980) calls the non-distribution constraint, which is a major precondition for voluntary donations to organizations; voluntary contributions cannot be redistributed among those in charge of the organization.

The exorbitant salaries received by top management thus crowded out intrinsically motivated corporate virtue in two ways. First, the honesty of the managers themselves was damaged in many cases. Second, the ensuing malpractices and excessive wages at the top undermined the honesty at lower levels because they felt like suckers. As conditional defectors, they too fell prey to all pervading greed, and were no longer prepared to contribute to the common good. This exacerbates the social dilemma.

Crowding-in Effect

A positive effect on intrinsic motivation of an external intervention or institution is called crowding-in. This effect has been investigated much less than the crowding-out effect (but see Deci and Ryan 2000). The most important condition for crowding-in intrinsic motivation is perceived autonomy, but perceived competence and social relatedness also matter. Thus, in Fig. 8.2, the crowding-in effect shifts the supply curve to the right. A pay rise, accompanied by supportive feedback, reflects appreciation of one's work and thus tends to increase work morale.

The need for autonomy refers to the need for personal causation. People, as suggested by DeCharms (1968), have a basic desire to experience themselves as causal agents. They would like to see themselves as initiators of action rather than as 'pawns'. However, this sense of internal locus of causality can be reduced. In contrast, contextual conditions can support this sense of autonomy if the agent is given choice and if using initiative is encouraged (for example, Zuckerman et al. 1978).

People also share the need for competence: that is, they want to control outcomes and experience efficacy. Each individual seeks to master his or her own way of dealing with the environment. A context in which feedback is provided enhances feelings of competence. Being informed influences one's perceived competence and strengthens the feeling of internal control.

Although autonomy and competence have been found to be the most powerful influences on intrinsic motivation, social relatedness also plays a role. As this need has only quite recently been incorporated into self-determination theory, not much empirical research has been done so far. However, a promising avenue of research into this area has been the work of Tyler and others (Tyler 1999; Tyler and Blader 2000), who express the need for social relatedness in the so-called group value model. This model tries to explain why people care about fairness and participation. Both aspects convey information on social standing, which in turn defines a person's status in a group and helps shape the person's self-worth (Tyler and Lind 1992). The precise conditions for this to happen are explored in the organizational justice literature, where procedural and interactive fairness have been analyzed for more than twenty years now (for example, Greenberg 1990; Lind and Tyler 1988).

The next section will show the consequences that can be inferred for corporate governance.

Why Agency Theory is Incomplete

Agency theory suggests three methods of countering the misuse of power by management: intensive monitoring and sanctioning, pay for performance, and corporate control by hostile takeovers. All three have proven to be ineffective (Dally, Dalton, and Canella 2003; Sundaramurthy and Lewis 2003).
Monitoring and Sanctioning

In a econometric study of 116 managers in medium-sized Dutch firms, Batraea (1995) found that the number of hours worked in the company decreased under intense supervision on the part of the superiors. This study underlines what Argyris (1964) suggests: strict control has a paradoxical effect. It leads to a never-ending and continuously expanding need to increase control. In view of the intensive interdependencies which characterize firms, this is a futile endeavor. Moreover, such an exercise seriously affects the loyalty of employees to their firms. In laboratory experiments, it was shown that negative sanctions crowd out intrinsically motivated trust (Bohnet, Frey, and Huck 2001; see Fehr and List 2002, who find similar results). Low levels of legal contract enforcement crowd in trustworthiness. Thus, more order results from less law.

Pay for Performance

Pay for performance does not lead to the expected alignment of the interest of managers with those of shareholders. Experience in recent years has shown that performance pay, by linking salaries to stock options, leads to an explosion of compensations due to the stock market boom. This trend has, in many cases, simply continued, even under changed economic conditions. Management compensation has often increased even more, despite the fact that share prices have plummeted. This suggests that, in reality, the compensation of managers has little to do with performance. Rather, the reason for the steady increase in compensation is due to the fact that managers are able to exert considerable control over the amount of money they get (see, for example, Benz, Kucher, and Stutzer 2002). Most importantly, they can do so by producing short-term increases in share prices or by re-pricing their stock options. Some managers even resorted to unlawfully misinterpreting their firms’ accounts in order to raise their private incomes. Looking back, it is possible to state that agency theory has obviously neglected the possibility of managers distorting their own standards of performance. Much of agency theory…unrealistically assumes that earnings and stock prices cannot be manipulated. That is a major weakness of the theory…(Becht, Bolton, and Röell, forthcoming: 47). These shortcomings have not been overcome by the board of directors, which proves unable to effectively control the managers. They would be made worse by the proposal of agency theorists to compensate board members according to performance. This provides board members with the same incentives as the management to manipulate performance standards. This might explain why equity compensation of board members is not positively associated with firm performance (Daily, Dalton, and Camela 2003), as agency theorists have claimed (Jensen 1993).

Control by Takeovers

Corporate control by hostile takeovers has received a great deal of attention from agency theorists. It has also proven to be far from effective from that point of view. Even in the US and the UK, it is seldom used and, in most other countries, it is almost non-existent. Managers are obviously able to mobilize anti-takeover defenses, such as super-majority amendments or poison pills (for a description, see Becht, Bolton, and Röell, forthcoming). Moreover, managers successfully supported regulatory interventions, making takeovers more difficult, or preventing them altogether (Romano 1993).

It may be concluded that the fundamental problem of ‘who watches the watcher’ is not solved by existing agency theory. In contrast, crowding theory provides strong arguments that the measures posed by the agency theory reinforce the very pro-self extrinsic motivation of managers that it is supposed to defeat. The dynamics between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation must therefore be introduced into an evolving theory to provide a better model of corporate governance and to overcome the problems ensuing from the misuse of management power. Empirical evidence suggests that stricter control and the threat of negative sanctions tend to decrease loyalty to the firm. Therefore, other approaches should be considered.

What to Do?

We advance three propositions for the design of corporate governance, taking heed of the insights gained from crowding theory.

Selection of Management

Selection processes should favor employees with pro-social intrinsic preferences. Selection criteria should not be restricted to purely efficiency-oriented aspects, as was the case with many of the scandalous firms. At Enron, with respect to managers, an executive admitted: ‘I never heard a discussion about a person’s teamwork or integrity or respect’ (Spector 2003: 215). This is important, because a higher number of intrinsically motivated, honest organization members increases conditional cooperation. Intrinsic motivation to behave honestly tends to be crowded out all the more if a large number of other members of the firm are acting in a dishonest way (Blair and Stout 2001b). Human Resources seem to be well aware of the importance of protecting the company from malefactors on the shop floor. In his book on wage rigidity, Bewley (1999) reports many instances in which the

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4 From the point of view of directors as mediators of the interests of different residual claimants, anti-takeover provisions make sense. They give directors the leeway to find solutions not only to the shareholders but also to other sectors making firm-specific investments in particular employees (see Blair and Stout 2001c: 422).
most important criterion when workers had to be dismissed was weeding out bad characters. But this insight was obviously not applied to management.

More Emphasis on Fixed Salaries

Selecting pro-socially motivated managers does not guarantee that they always act in an appropriate way. According to North (1990: 48), there is a downward sloping demand curve for moral concern. The more costly it gets, the less people contribute. Conversely, if a low-cost decision for each individual is at stake, many of them contribute small amounts to the common good so that the total amount of contributions rises considerably. As a consequence, it is important to look for institutions favoring low-cost-decisions (Kirchgässner 1992). An important means to design low-cost situations to overcome the social dilemmas in a firm is to give fixed salaries more prominence again. Four empirical results support such a change in policy.

First, a recently published review on different types of variable pay suggests that even small percentages of monetary incentives—often as low as 3 per cent of a person’s total pay—increased performance appreciably. It appears that the actual amount of incentive pay as a proportion of fixed pay can be quite small and still be effective (Backlin and Dickinson 2001). It is not surprising that such small monetary rewards are perceived mainly as a feedback which supports crowding rather than as an external control.

Second, public governance teaches us that politicians, public officials, and judges receive fixed salaries because those persons who set the regulations should not be given an incentive to manipulate the corresponding criteria in their own favor (Frey 2003). In management, the exact opposite took place: the top executives were given the opportunity to manipulate the criteria by which they were evaluated and compensated.

Third, people behave more cooperatively when they are told to do so. In experiments, subjects behave more pro-socially when the experimenter suggests that they should do so, even without external incentives (Blair and Stout 2001b). Over the last decade, principal-agency theorists prompted managers and directors to think that performance without incentive pay is irrational. This certainly had an effect on their behavior. As Paul Volker, the former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board remarked: ‘Traditional norms didn’t exist. You had this whole culture where the only sign of worth was how much money you made’ (Cassidy 2002).

Fourth, there is strong empirical evidence that even honest people are subject to an unconscious ‘self-serving bias’. In situations characterized by ambiguity or discretion, it is typical that managerial decision-making judgments of what constitutes fairness conflates with what is beneficial for oneself. Unlike conscious corruption, such confusion cannot be deterred by sanctions (Balbo and Loewenstein 1997; Bazerman, Loewenstein, and Moore 2002a). Instead, it can be reduced by lowering the incentives to take care of one’s own interests. This can be achieved by attributing more importance to fixed wages for managers as well as for board members. With respect to the self-serving bias, it is most important not to compensate the board members according to the same criteria (e.g., stock prices) as the management, because the self-serving bias would unconsciously undermine the willingness to control.

Managers must be paid a fair market wage in exchange for their overall performance, thus reducing the temptations to cheat the firm, consciously or unconsciously. According to crowding theory, greater emphasis on fixed salaries reduces crowding out of pro-social intrinsic preferences, for two reasons. As we have argued, excessive short-term pay for performance by means of bonuses and stock options, under identifiable conditions undermines the loyalty voluntarily offered to the company by inducing a switch to a purely calculating mode. As a consequence, a contract including pro-social motives is changed into a purely selfishly motivated contract (Lindenberg, Chapter 9, this volume). Moreover, most people cooperate only as long as others do so too. Therefore, when top management lines its pockets, many employees also start maximizing their monetary incomes by whatever means, including fraudulent bookkeeping. Employees are no longer prepared to oppose the wrongdoings of their bosses. They no longer feel obliged to support corporate virtue.

Participation and Increased Self-Governance of Employees

The decision-making process of firms must strengthen participation and self-governance as a part of corporate governance. It promotes self-monitoring and sanctioning in an informal way by the corporate community and thereby reduces the breaking of rules. As monitoring and blaming colleagues and superiors carry at least psychic costs (and sometimes ruin one’s career), civic virtue is needed. Extensive experimental and field research shows that civic virtues are strengthened by procedural utility. Anyone breaking the rules is more easily identified by colleagues than by superiors, and is informally admonished. This has the expressive function of ensuring that others are doing their part in using the common good wisely. Experiments show that sanctions perceived as pro-socially motivated enhance cooperative behavior, whereas sanctions serving the punisher’s self-interest crowd it out (Fehr and Rockenbach 2003). This is important because making people feel shame works only if employees feel at least some minimal intrinsically motivated obligation to follow the rules and to contribute to the common good. Purely rational egoists do not experience any shame (Elster 1999; Orr 2001); this again underlines the importance of intrinsically motivated corporate virtue. This conclusion is empirically supported by evidence in the literature on
organizational citizenship behavior (Organ 1988), procedural utility (Frey and Stutzer 2002), and procedural justice (Tyler and Blader 2000).

Conclusions

The reactions of principal-agent theorists and politicians to the malpractices and excessive compensations of top management by intensifying monitoring and sanctioning tend to worsen the very problems they are designed to solve. The apparent remedy raises the incentives of managers and other employees to take advantage of the very firm they are supposed to care about. The conditions leading to ‘a governance of crooks’ have to be taken into account. Instead of stricter monitoring and sanctioning, we suggest three alternatives. First, the selection of managers should emphasize pro-social intrinsic preferences to ensure the conditional cooperation of other employees. Second, care must be taken not to crowd out the corporate virtue based on the intrinsic motivation of managers and employees. We suggest that stronger emphasis should again be placed on fixed salaries to avoid the crowding-out effect and to reduce the temptation to cheat. Third, employees’ willingness to contribute to corporate virtue by identifying and admonishing anyone resorting to fraudulent accounting must be strengthened by participation possibilities and self-governance.

These proposals clash with conventional wisdom but, based on existing research, they promise to yield better long-term results than governance structures made for crooks.

References


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