Moral and immoral views on paying taxes

Bruno S. Frey & Manfred J. Holler*

Strong empirical evidence suggests that, contrary to standard criminal choice theory, deterrence does not increase tax compliance. A model based on a peculiarity of the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in 2-by-2 games is used to explain this observation theoretically: The strategy choice of a player is not affected by the changes in his or her payoffs induced by deterrence. Moreover, as empirical observations suggest that increased deterrence tends to undermine tax morale, it follows that tax policy should not so much try to deter but should make an effort to raise or at least citizens' tax morale.

1. Introduction

On the occasion of the meeting of the European Public Choice Society at Turin in April 1992, the authors of this paper discovered that they had two alternative models which explain why higher penalty rates do not decrease tax evasion (see Roth, Scholz, and Witte, 1989, for this result). The size of the deterrence effect (in the few cases where it has been found statistically significant) is very small, and less consequential than the impact of other factors (see, e.g., Paternoster, 1989). Calculation based on empirical magnitudes for the United States show that 'taxpayers would have to exhibit risk aversion far in excess of anything ever observed for compliance predicted by expected utility theory to approximate actual compliance' (Alt, McKee and Beck, 1990, p. 24). As a reaction to similar calculations for different periods, other authors go so far as to state that 'most of the theoretical work to date is not particularly useful either for policy analysis or empirical study' (Graetz and Wilde, 1985, p. 337).

The standard economic theory of tax evasion was first formulated by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) based on Becker's (1968) model of criminal choice. Taxpayers are assumed to maximize expected utility which depends on noncompliance detection probabilities, the magnitude of punishment and incomes and tax rates. While the effects of higher income and higher tax rates on tax evasion depend on additional factors (in particular relative risk aversion), virtually all models subscribe to the notion underlying the economics of crime: an increase in the probability of being detected and punished ceteris paribus decreases tax evasion. Rational taxpayers should react to the higher cost of cheating by cheating less.

The empirical findings, however, suggest that deterrence does not work as expected in the important case of tax evasion. This challenges the standard criminal choice model developed in, as well as the compliance policy advocated by, standard economics. The authors of this paper were therefore quite excited when they found out that they had two models available to meet this challenge; they decided to write a joint paper and submit the result to a scientific journal for publication. Manfred Holler presents a game theoretical model based on a peculiarity of the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in 2-by-2 games. In the mixed-strategy equilibrium, the strategy choice of a player is not affected by the changes in his or her payoffs; thus, payoff changes induced by deterrence have no effect on tax compliance. On April 29, 1985, presented an earlier version of this model at the Department of Philosophy. Timo Airaksinen arranged a seminar and Georg Henrik von Wright chaired the session. (See footnote 1 in Holler (1986).) Bruno Frey argues that increased deterrence tends to undermine tax morale and thus counteracts the deterrence effect which may result from an increase of the penalty if tax morale does not change.

When the paper was completed and submitted to a scientific journal, an anonymous reviewer argued that 'this is really two different papers which have merged into one. They are obviously related in that both are concerned with tax evasion and deterrence policy, but otherwise the connection between them is quite thin'. The editor of the journal concluded that the two parts of the paper should be integrated or developed separately and invited the authors to resubmit the paper if after considering the reviewer's position. However, the authors still consider it meritorious that the paper contains two very different models of human behavior which explain the same phenomenon. They also hope that the obvious parallelism between the rational choice model and the model of moral behavior, which characterizes the following analysis, contributes to the ongoing discussion of a rational theory of morale behavior (see, e.g., Binmore, 1994, for a recent contribution).

Section 2 presents a game theoretical model. It demonstrates that, in the case of a Nash equilibrium, a reduction of the payoffs to a taxpayer due to punishment has no effect on his or her choice if the Nash equilibrium is mixed. In section 3, we propose that more intensive monitoring and higher fines may crowd out tax morale so that an increase in deterrence may under some conditions have a perverse effect on compliance, i.e., tax evasion may increase. Section 4 discusses alternative tax compliance policies. Our results indicate the importance of citizens' morale for a successful tax policy.
2. A strategic approach to tax compliance

In this section, an explanation for the ineffectiveness of deterrence based on a game theoretic model is presented. The model assumes that the taxpayer sees himself or herself in a decision situation where (i) the outcome results from decisions of the taxpayer and the tax authority, (ii) the tax authority forms expectations about the behavior of the taxpayer, (iii) the taxpayer forms expectations about the behavior of the tax authority, (iv) taxpayer and tax authority know about (i), (ii), and (iii), and (v) they know their own strategy set and their preferences on the outcome of the tax game as well as the strategy set and the preferences of their opponent in the game (i.e., we assume complete information). The strategy set of the taxpayer (player TP), S1, contains two pure strategies: cheat (C) and not cheat (NC). The strategy set of the tax authority (player TA), S2, contains two pure strategies: deter (D) and not deter (ND). We allow for mixed strategies, i.e., we assume that (1) TP may expect TA to randomize on choosing between D or ND with probability q for D, and (2) TP may randomize on C and NC with probability p for strategy C. There are four outcomes, each implemented by one of the four pairs of pure strategies. The evaluation of the outcomes and the corresponding strategies are summarized by the payoff matrix in Figure 1.

Figure 1: The taxpayer / tax authority game

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tax Authority (TA)</th>
<th>Deter (D)</th>
<th>Not Deter (ND)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cheat (C)</td>
<td>(a, α)</td>
<td>(b, β)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Cheat (NC)</td>
<td>(c, γ)</td>
<td>(d, δ)</td>
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It seems plausible to assume the following ranking of the payoffs:

(A.I) (i) b > a, b > d, c > a, c > d for taxpayers
and
(ii) α > β, α > γ, δ > β, δ > γ for the tax authority.

Most payoff relationships are rather straightforward and need not be commented on any further. The relation c > d, however, does not seem to be obvious; it implies that TP prefers deterrence to non-deterrence in case that TP does not cheat - which parallels the pleasure potential smugglers enjoy at the border when they get searched by the custom officer but do not carry hot goods with them. Honest taxpayers may prefer deterrence for equity reason: they want tax cheaters to be punished so that such people do not enjoy advantage compared to themselves. The motivation corresponds to the notion of tax morale which, as we have argued in the previous section, tends to be undermined if the tax authorities do not treat taxpayers equally, i.e., in a fair manner.

The relation α > γ may express a catch premium given by the policy maker to the tax officials if they detect a cheating taxpayer. We will come back to this interpretation in section 4. There is, however, also a motivational interpretation of the relation α > γ. Tax officials would feel superfluous and would become demotivated if taxpayers were completely honest. The tax officials can only justify their deterrence policy and the use of resources in fighting tax evasion (to themselves as well as to the public) if indeed some taxpayers cheat.

A policy maker, P, say the parliament or the government, cannot perfectly control the tax authority, however, it is assumed to be able to manipulate payoff a which results from cheating (C) and deterrence (D) within the limits given by (A.I). Alternatively, we will consider that P can offer a catch premium, implied by an increase of α. P’s preferences on the outcomes of this game follow the ranking (NC, ND) > (NC, D) > (C, D) > (C, NC), i.e., x₁ > x₂ > x₃ > x₄ in Figure 2. Thus, irrespective of the decision of the tax authority, P prefers the taxpayer to choose NC instead of C. This ranking of P’s preferences also takes care of the fact that auditing and paying a catch premium are costly to P.

The informational structure of this game is characterized by the following assumptions: (i) P determines the level of a, before TP and TA make their strategy choices and (ii) the payoff matrix in Figure 1 is known to TP and TA before they simultaneously, i.e., without knowing the other’s strategy choice, decide on their strategies. The interactive decision situation can be illustrated by the game tree in Figure 2.

The dotted line between the two nodes of TP expresses that TP does not know whether the tax authority TA has chosen D or ND when making his decision on C and NC. This structure depicts the imperfect information of TP in the game. The imperfect information of TA is captured by the sequence of the game tree: By assuming that TA is first to make its decisions, we exclude that TA knows which strategy TP selects. Obviously, there is a second tree which equivalently illustrates the strategic decision situation of our model. It results from exchanging TP and TA and the corresponding strategies in Figure 2.

The strategic situation in which an individual taxpayer and a tax official see themselves are considered as of one-shot, i.e., both agents assume that a previous specific decision situation will not repeat itself in future periods. This assumption can be justified by the structural anonymity of large numbers typical for taxation
in larger communities, or by the strategic anonymity stemming from bureaucratic rules designed to minimize reputation effects, so that cooperation from repeated interaction is restricted. One of these rules is that the material of a specific tax is never be checked by the same tax official in two su!

Figure 2: The principal-agent-controller mode

The principal's preferences: \( X_1 > X_2 > X_3 > X_4 \)

If the political decision maker P can manipulate payoff a over a continuous interval of values, then Figure 2 expresses an infinite set of games consistent with our model. It is up to P to decide what game TA and TP play. In order to select the preferred game, P has to know what strategies TP and TA will choose in the various settings corresponding to alternative values of a. This problem is not easy to solve. To answer the question how TP will decide implies that TP can form expectations on how TA decides, given that TP is a (Bayesian) rational player. (See Tan and Werlang (1988).) The corresponding view holds for TA, provided TA is rational.

To form expectations is equivalent to applying solution concepts to the game in order to break down the complexity created by the interrelationship of the choices, via outcomes and payoffs, and the information of the players. Various solution concepts can serve as indicators for the players to grasp the strategic interdependency inherent to an interactive decision situation as described in Figure 1 and prepare for an analysis of the decision making. Given the constraints in (A1), the game in Figure 1 has no pure strategy Nash equilibrium (and thus, of course, no equilibrium in dominating strategies). The pure maximin strategy of TP is determined by the relative size of a and d while the pure maximin strategy of TA depends on whether \( b > \gamma \) or \( b < \gamma \) holds. Since we have no immediate justification for any of these relations, the application of the pure-strategy maximin solution seems somewhat vacuous. Given condition (A.1), we do not specify these relations. Let us assume that the payoffs of the players are of von Neumann Morgenstern type, and thus characterized by cardinality. This allows calculate mixed strategy pairs for the Nash equilibrium and for the maximin solution of the game in Figure 1. (Note since the von Neumann Morgenstern utility functions, \( U_i (i = TP, TA) \), satisfy the expected utility hypothesis, no mention has to be made between 'payoffs' and 'expected payoffs' in what follows.)

If \( p \) is, as defined, the probability of TP selecting strategy C and \( q \) is the probability of TA selecting D, then the (mixed strategy) Nash equilibrium is characterized by the pair \((p^*, q^*)\) such that

1. \( U_{TP}(p^*, q^*) \geq U_{TP}(p, q^*) \) for all \( p \in [0,1] \) and \( U_{TA}(p^*, q^*) \geq U_{TA}(p, q) \) for all \( q \in [0,1] \).

Condition (1) is fulfilled if \( q^* \) satisfies

2. \( qa + (1-q) b = qc + (1-q) d \)

and if \( p^* \) satisfies

3. \( p\alpha + (1-p) \gamma = p\beta + (1-p) \delta. \)

Satisfying (2a), \( q^* \) makes TP indifferent with respect to all \( p \in [0,1] \) and thus also for \( p^* \). That is, TA's strategy \( q^* \) fixes the payoff value of TP to a constant value. The corresponding result applies to \( p^* \): TP's strategy \( p^* \) fixes the payoff value of TA.

Solving (2a) and (2b) we get

3a. \( p^* = (\delta - \gamma) / (\alpha - \beta - \gamma + \delta) \)

3b. \( q^* = (d - b) / (a - b - c + d) \)

From (3a) and (3b) the following result is immediate:
**Result 1:** In 2-by-2 (two-person matrix) games, player i’s Nash equilibrium strategy is independent of i’s payoff values if it is mixed.

The mixed strategy maximin solution, characterized by the probability pair \((p^*, q^*)\), derives from the equations

\begin{align}
(4a) \quad p^* + (1-p^*) \cdot c &= pb + (1-p) \cdot d \\
(4b) \quad q^* + (1-q^*) \cdot d &= qy + (1-q) \cdot \delta
\end{align}

TP’s strategy \(p^*\), which satisfies \((4a)\), fixes TP’s payoff value and makes it independent of the strategy choice of TA. Similarly, TA’s strategy \(q^*\), which satisfies \((4b)\), fixes TA’s payoff value and makes it independent of the strategy choice of TP. Thus we have

\begin{align}
U_{TP}(p^*, q) &\geq \min_{q \in [0,1]} U_{TP}(p, q) \text{ for all } q \in [0,1] \\
U_{TA}(p, q^*) &\geq \min_{p \in [0,1]} U_{TA}(p, q) \text{ for all } p \in [0,1].
\end{align}

Solving \((4a)\) and \((4b)\) we get

\begin{align}
(6a) \quad p^* &= (d - c) / (a - b - c + d) \\
(6b) \quad q^* &= (\delta - \delta) / (\alpha - \delta - \gamma + \delta)
\end{align}

In order to calculate the payoffs of TP and TA for the Nash equilibrium and for the maximin solution, we plug \(p^*\) and \(q^*\) into \((2a)\) and \((2b)\) and \(p^*\) and \(q^*\) into \((4a)\) and \((4b)\) alternatively. We get

\begin{align}
(7a) \quad U_{TP}(q^*) &= (ad-bc) / (a-b-c+d) = U_{TP}(p^*) \\
(7b) \quad U_{TA}(p^*) &= (ad-bg) / (a-b-g+d) = U_{TA}(q^*)
\end{align}

Thus we have

**Result 2:** In 2-by-2 (two-person matrix) games, player i’s Nash equilibrium payoff is identical to i’s maximin payoff if both solutions contain mixed strategies.

Result 2 (which is derived in Holler (1990)) says that the Nash equilibrium is ‘unprofitable’ (see Harsanyi, 1977, pp.104-107). It raises the question why, e.g., TP should play Nash equilibrium strategies if the expected payoff of the Nash equilibrium is identical to the payoff of playing maximin, i.e., identical to the payoff which TP can guarantee himself, irrespective of what strategy TA selects - while the Nash equilibrium payoff of TP is exclusively determined by TA’s strategy choice. To justify \(p^*\) as a best reply assumes that TA plays \(q^*\). That is, \(p^*\) is only optimal, if TA chooses \(q^*\). In this case, however, any other \(p\) (including the pure strategies \(p = 1\) and \(p = 0\)) would also be a best reply. The Nash equilibrium \((p^*, q^*)\) is weak; thus it does not ‘hurt’ a player choosing an alternative strategy.

The maximin solution, however, prescribes strategies which are, in general, not best replies to each other. That is, given the maximin strategy of TA, TP could do better by choosing an alternative strategy to maximin, and vice versa. If the game is one-shot, then players have no possibility to revise their strategies. Does it matter under these circumstances that they might regret what they have done after implementing the maximin outcome? And if they regret and play the Gedankenexperiment of revisions in order to end up in a strategy pair of mutually best replies, i.e., the Nash equilibrium, what are the payoffs from the solution? The answer is: The same payoffs as in the maximin solution.

We do not further discuss here which solution concept is the right one (for arguments, see Holler, 1990; 1993) but accept both the Nash equilibrium and the maximin solution as a point of departure to discuss P’s policy with respect to manipulating payoff a. Of course, the optimal policy of P in choosing a will depend on what solution concepts P assumes TP and TA will follow in case TP and TA think strategically, i.e., whether they are expected to be Nash players (choosing strategies in accordance with \((3a)\) and \((3b)\), respectively) or maximin players (choosing strategies in accordance with \((6a)\) and \((6b)\), respectively).

**Case 1:** Both TP and TA are Nash players. A decrease of a motivates TA to reduce the probability of deterrence, \(q^*\), while the probability of cheating, \(p^*\), remains unchanged. That is \((C,D)\) becomes less likely while the probability of the strategy pair \((C,N,D)\) increases.

**Case 2:** Both TP and TA are maximin players. A decrease of \(a\) motivates TP to reduce the probability of cheating, \(p^*\), while \(q^*\) remains unchanged. That is \((C,D)\) becomes less likely while the probabilities of the strategy pairs \((N,C,D)\) and \((N,C,N,D)\), both preferred by P to \((C,D)\), increases. This result is favourable to P.

**Case 3:** TP is a maximin player and TA is a Nash player. A decrease of \(a\) motivates TP to reduce the probability of cheating, \(p^*\), while TA will reduce the probability of deterrence, \(q^*\). Thus \((C,D)\) becomes even less likely than in CASE 1 and in CASE 2, given \(a\) is reduced by the same amount, while the probability of the strategy pair \((N,C,N,D)\), P’s preferred choice, increases.

**Case 4:** TA is a maximin player and TP is a Nash player. A decrease of \(a\) has
no impact on the probabilities q⁺ and p⁺ and thus leaves the behavior of both parties unchanged.

Figure 3: Changes of Maximin and Nash strategies induced by a reduction of payoff \( a \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tax Authority (TA)</th>
<th>Maximin</th>
<th>Nash</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maximin</td>
<td>( p⁺ \downarrow, q⁺ )</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nash</td>
<td>( p⁺, q⁺ )</td>
<td>( p⁺, q⁺ )</td>
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</table>

Figure 3 summarizes the effects of a decrease of \( a \) on the strategy choices which derive for alternative behavioral assumptions.

We can confront these four cases of strategic interaction with cases where TP is assumed to be a naive utility maximizer as implied by standard criminal choice theory. This case can, however, be summarized as follows: Because of a reduction of \( a \), cheating becomes a less likely choice, i.e., the probability \( p \) of strategy C decreases, if TP assumes the probabilities of TA choosing D and ND (q and 1-q) to remain unchanged. The latter assumption holds if TA is a maximin player or a naive utility maximizer, the latter assuming the probabilities of C and NC to be unaffected by the decrease of \( a \). This result is positively evaluated by P. However, if TA is a Nash player, TA will reduce the probability of deterrence, \( q⁺ \), which corresponds to an increase of the probability of non-deterrence. Depending on the magnitude of the probabilities (i.e., of the magnitudes of TP’s payoffs in Figure 1), the probability of the strategy pair \( (C, ND) \), which is the least preferred result to P, will increase, decrease, or remain constant.

If, however, TP expects TA to be a Nash player then we are back to strategic reasoning and CASE 1: while D will become less likely due to a decrease of \( a \), the Nash strategy of TP, \( p⁺ \), will not be affected by a change of \( a \). Moreover, any decision of TP will be a best reply to TA’s Nash strategy \( q⁺ \). Thus we have to conclude from the preceding analysis that deterrence does not work if taxpayers and the tax authority see themselves involved in a game situation characterized by the strategies and payoffs represented in Figure 1 and by condition (A.1). This outcome is consistent with the empirical observations cited. However, given the equality of expected payoffs in Nash equilibrium and maximin solution we may argue that, for this game, maximin is a more plausible solution concept than Nash equilibrium.

A decrease of payoff \( a \) through deterrence then induces a decrease of the probability of cheating (i.e., \( p⁺ \)). This result corresponds to the result of standard criminal choice theory, although it is motivated by a rather different reasoning, but it is inconsistent with the quoted empirical observations. On the one hand, this falsifies the arguments which support maximin. On the other hand, it questions the game model above which described the strategic relationships between taxpayers and tax authorities.

Let us follow the path of mainstream game theory, however, and accept the result suggested by the Nash equilibrium concept. Is there a strategy which frees the policy maker from the strategic trap which deterrence policy builds up? We may consider a catch premium, implied by an increase of \( a \) as an alternative to the unsuccessful deterrence policy of reducing \( a \). The results of this policy (e.g., analysed in Holler (1993)) are summarized in Figure 4.

Figure 4: Changes of Maximin and Nash strategies induced by an increase of payoff \( a \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tax Authority (TA)</th>
<th>Nash</th>
<th>Maximin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nash</td>
<td>( p⁺ \downarrow, q⁺ )</td>
<td>( p⁺ \downarrow, q⁺ )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxpayer (TP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximin</td>
<td>( p⁺, q⁺ )</td>
<td>( p⁺, q⁺ )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Naive (non-strategic) policy suggests that an increase of \( \alpha \) is followed by an increase of the probability \( q \) of auditing (implying an increase of expected deterrence) reducing a lower probability \( p \) of cheating. Indeed, the Nash equilibrium strategy of TP implies a reduction of \( p \) - although \( q \) remains constant. If, however, TP follows the maximin solution concept, the probability of cheating remains constant since \( p⁺ \) does not depend on \( \alpha \). It is, however, peculiar to see that TA will reduce the auditing probability, \( q \), if \( \alpha \) increases and TA follows the maximin recipe. That is, auditing becomes less likely - but the probability of cheating will remain constant, if TP follows maximin, or even decrease, if TP follows Nash.

To summarize: a decrease or an increase in the catch premium \( \alpha \) and therewith a variation in deterrence is not a reliable policy for the tax authority to influence tax compliance. To ensure compliance within the postulated strategic framework, non-cheating (NC) has to be made a dominant strategy. Since (A.1) assumes \( c > a \) the dominance of NC hinges on generating \( d > h \). So far, however, \( d < b \) expresses the
benefits of tax evasion. Moreover, it seems that nothing can be done by the taxpayers to change this relationship. One possibility is to raise citizens’ tax morale by so much that the monetary gain from tax evasion in the case of non-deterrence is overcompensated. If this holds, non deterrence is a host-reply strategy of the tax authority. Is it plausible to assume that the tax authority is able to increase \( d \) so that \( d > b \) follows? This question will be discussed in the following section.

3. Tax morale and compliance

Empirically oriented econometric, survey and experimental research has, at least in part, acknowledged the importance of tax morale\(^6\). What has so far not been considered is that deterrence in the form of both stricter auditing and higher punishment may, under specific conditions, systematically reduce intrinsic motivation to pay taxes, i.e., an increase in a may reduce \( d \). This makes tax morale an endogenous factor in a model of compliance (see, in general, Frey, 1992). Cognitive experimental social psychology has identified two general circumstances in which deterrence reduces intrinsic motivation: violation of a basic norm of reciprocity (see, e.g., Gouldner, 1960) and reduction of overjustification (see, e.g., Pinto and Heller, 1987).

Reciprocity implies that a taxpayer considers his or her particular tax balance. If the exchange between the tax paid and the government services performed are found to be equitable, the taxpayer is more inclined to comply to the law than if he or she evaluates the exchange to be unfair. An increase in deterrence disrupts this balance for an honest taxpayer. This feeling is strongest when a taxpayer who personally considers himself to have paid a fair due, is audited and fined; or when he or she notes that other taxpayers violating the tax law do not get punished. When such errors of type I (fining an honest taxpayer) and of type II (not fining a dishonest taxpayer) occur the intrinsic motivation to comply to tax law is undermined and a higher extent of tax evasion is observed than if no such moral effect existed.

Reduction of overjustification states that when people are extrinsically rewarded for a task which they are ready to undertake for their own satisfaction, the intrinsic reason is negatively affected or crowded out. As a result, when the extrinsic reward is discontinued, less of the task will be performed. (Such ‘hidden costs of rewards’ are reported and discussed in, e.g., McGraw (1978) and Deci and Ryan (1985); for experimental evidence see also Deci and Ryan (1980).) This implies that taxpayers, who consider themselves honest, feel ‘overjustified’ when their high tax morale is not required because the auditing and fining scheme of the tax authorities force compliance upon them anyway. Thus, when deterrence is increased, the taxpayers are rational to reduce their tax morale in order to regain the least cost equilibrium, i.e., to produce performance at the lowest possible costs.

Taking the effect of increased deterrence on tax morale into account within the framework of a standard economic model allows us to derive empirically testable propositions of the tax evasion phenomena. In the following, we will discuss three propositions and relate them to empirical findings.

**Proposition 1:** The insignificant and/or ambiguous effect of deterrence on tax compliance can be explained by the fact that the effect of deterrence on tax morale has been disregarded.

To illustrate this proposition we use the following standard equation for tax compliance estimation as a point of departure:

\[
T = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 D + \beta Z
\]

where \( T \) measures the extent of tax compliance, \( D \) represents deterrence (i.e., auditing an detection probabilities as well as the magnitude of punishment) and \( Z \) summarizes other influences on tax-compliance including income and tax rates. Criminal choice theory assumes that deterrence works, i.e. \( \alpha_1 > 0 \).

Now consider an alternative model in which tax morale \( M \) influences tax compliance and in which deterrence undermines tax morale (for simplicity, in a linear way):

\[
T = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 D + \alpha_2 M + \beta Z \quad \text{with} \quad \alpha_2 > 0
\]

\[
M = m_0 - m_1 D \quad \text{with} \quad m_0, m_1 > 0.
\]

Thus we get

\[
T = \delta_0 + \delta_1 D + \beta Z
\]

where \( \delta_0 = (\alpha_0 + \alpha_2 m_0) > 0 \) and \( \delta_1 = (\alpha_1 - \alpha_2 m_1) \). If the deterrence effect is smaller than the undermining effect on tax morale \( \alpha_1 < \alpha_2 m_1 \), deterrence reduces compliance \( \delta_1 < 0 \). A number of studies have found a negative deterrence effect. It is no fluke that many of them are survey studies, which do pay attention to tax morale (e.g., Spicer and Lundstedt, 1976; Westat, 1980; Yankelovich et al., 1984).

An Internal Revenue Service study (1973) - not based on surveys but on the effect 1967-69 audit histories of taxpayers on 1968-69 - reports tax liabilities: For three out of four medium-income and high-income classes (which have the best opportunities to conceal income), the audits were associated with lower reported tax liabilities, thus also observing a perverse effect of deterrence on tax compliance.

The negative effect can of course be attributed to many different causes (such as selection biases) but is consistent with a model in which, under specific conditions, the undermining effect of deterrence on tax morale (captured by \( \delta_2 m_1 \))
dominates the effects of deterrence (expressed by \(\alpha_i > 0\)) as suggested by standard criminal choice theory. Whether this relation applies cannot always be unambiguously shown. However, there is some empirical evidence which supports the following proposition.

**Proposition 2:** A cooperative relationship between taxpayers and tax authorities may lead to the same level of tax compliance as a coercive relationship based on deterrence.

In their comparative study of the European tax system, based on surveys of 1,000 individuals, Schmölders (1970) and Strümpel (1969) studied the effects of different enforcement levels on compliance and attitudes. They found a striking difference between Germany and Britain. The German system is strict and stresses coercive enforcement while the British one is relatively cautious, more lenient and the atmosphere between taxpayers and tax officials is more cooperative. However, the general level of tax compliance achieved in the two countries was quite similar. Indeed, Schmölders and Strümpel observed that tax morale in Germany was significantly lower than in Britain. - The reason why the two tax authorities pursued a different policy is based on historical and institutional conditions specific to the two countries. British citizens with their long democratic tradition and respect for private rights tend to resent intrusions by the tax authorities more strongly than do the Germans who are used to believe in authoritarian structures and in government doing what is good for them.

We can model the differences of aversion to deterrence on optimal compliance policy. Let us assume that tax authorities want to maximize tax compliance; and that tax compliance depends on both deterrence and tax morale so that

\[
T = T(D, M) \quad \text{with} \quad T_D \geq 0, T_M \geq 0
\]

and \(T_{DD} < 0, T_{MM} < 0\)

Tax authorities will decide on the quantity of auditing and punishment (i.e., deterrence) so that

\[
T_D + T_M(dM/dD) = 0
\]

Obviously, it depends on the sign of \(dM/dD\) of whether the tax authority should increase, reduce or keep constant deterrence D. If, following the above discussion, we assume that \(dM/dD = -\alpha_1 < 0\) then rational tax administrators will employ less deterrence than in the standard criminal choice model.

From the analyses of Schmölders (1970) and Strümpel (1969) we conclude that the British had a stronger aversion to raising taxes by deterrence than the Germans, i.e., the product \(-dM/dD T_M\) was larger for Britain than for Germany. If we assume a similar marginal effectiveness of deterrence on compliance \(T_D\) in both countries, the model suggests a lower optimal degree of deterrence in Britain than in Germany. This is consistent with the empirical evidence found by Schmölders (1970) and Strümpel (1969).

A generalization of this results is captured by

**Proposition 3:** The cooperative atmosphere between taxpayers and tax authorities, resulting in high tax morale, is the larger, the more extensive the democratic participation possibilities are.

The amount of cooperation and trust between taxpayers and tax authorities varies greatly between nations; in some countries it scarcely exists, while it seems to be of considerable importance in countries such as Britain and the United States. For Switzerland, it has been shown by econometric cross section estimates that in cantons with more developed institutions of direct democratic participation (referenda and initiatives), in which a higher tax morale can be expected, tax compliance is *ceteris paribus* significantly larger (Pommerehne and Frey, 1992). Breaking the relationship of trust one-sidedly by imposing stricter auditing and higher fines, would make many taxpayers feel that their tax morale is not adequately recognized by the tax authorities. This induces taxpayers to reduce what they consider to be their 'excess' tax morale leading them to more strongly undercut their taxable income.

**4. Tax policy and tax morale**

Our analysis based on a game theoretical model suggests that deterrence is an ineffective policy to raise citizens' tax compliance. Moreover, if deterrence indeed reduces tax morale, as argued in section 3 of this paper, non-deterrence raises the payoff of the taxpayer because his high tax morale is acknowledged by the tax authority. If this effect is strong enough to compensate the monetary gains from tax evasion in the case of non-deterrence, then non-deterrence is a best reply strategy of the tax authority.

The policy maker may be well advised to strengthen tax morale instead of trying to increase tax compliance by payoff policies. To rely on moral persuasion may, however, result in a too optimistic policy and of course its success depends on the general level of morale existing in the tax-paying community. It was Machiavelli who stated that 'in the province of Germany it is quite clear that goodness and respect for religion are still to be found in its peoples' and 'when these republics have need to spend any sum of money on the public account... each person presents himself to the tax-collectors in accordance with the constitutional practice.
of the town. He then takes an oath to pay the appropriate sum, and throws into a chest provided for the purpose the amount which he conscientiously thinks he ought to pay; but of this payment there is no witness save the man who pays' (1983, pp. 244-245). For his beloved Italy no such traits existed and Machiavelli therefore suggested oppressive policies and rules to the 'Prince' to be applied in order to stabilize society by tyrannical power. With respect to the strategic situation given by Figure 1, tyrannical policy coincides with increasing deterrence and manipulating the payoffs of the tax officers so that D becomes a dominating strategy and NC (i.e. compliance) becomes the only best reply.

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Taking the Liberal Challenge Seriously
Essays on Contemporary Liberalism at the Turn of the 21st Century

The authors dedicate this book to their longtime colleague and friend, Professor Timo Airaksinen, University of Helsinki, on the occasion of his 50th birthday, for his extensive philosophical work dealing with the problems and prospects of modern liberal thought.

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